The amenability of satellites to on-orbit servicing (OOS) is assessed through the development of an agent-based model. With the context of a multi-year servicing campaign in the GEO (geosynchronous orbit) belt, OOS is treated as a multi-variable optimization problem with the principal trade of minimizing both ∆V (change in velocity) expenditures and transfer time. Assuming current launch vehicle, propulsion, and robotic technology for servicing vehicles, the focus in the model is on the serviceability of target satellites. Servicing vehicle operations are simulated over time, completing maneuvers as a function of pathdependent servicing operations. Primary outputs of the agent model are the cost of servicing (mean ∆V expenditure by servicing vehicle for satisfying tickets) and the performance of target satellites (availability for mission operations). Many interesting lessons emerged from the agent-based model of OOS with implications for both serviceability assessments of target satellites and servicing provider architecture. Most fundamentally, the high availability of GEO satellites in the model suggests that satellites work too well to stress a simple OOS system. Servicing vehicles were idle more than 90% of the time leading to a probability of two or more servicing vehicles conducting missions simultaneously of less than 1%. OOS business models need to balance the attraction of GEO due to the high concentration of valuable spacecraft and friendly orbital dynamics with the high-reliability of GEO satellites launched over the past two decades. ∆V proximity = Velocity change necessary for servicer to adjust to proximity operations at target satellite
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1 This is particularly unfortunate given that a typical geosynchronous Earth orbit (GEO) satellite costs around $125 million for the satellite and launch. 2 The critical mission areas fulfilled by government space programs and the drive for investor return in the commercial space industry combined with the high cost of space systems has led to an extremely risk-averse industry. This environment has driven satellite designers toward three common elements of design: redundancy, proven technology, and long operational lives. 3 There are several tradeoffs associated with this paradigm. While massive redundancy mitigates the risk of component failure, its value is only delivered in the event of component failure. Use of legacy technology may ensure flight-qualified hardware, but it also limits payload performance and industry innovation. Furthermore, while long design lifetimes (e.g., approaching 14 years for GEO communications satellites 4 ) maximize investor return for payloads that are expensive to build but relatively inexpensive to operate, long lifetimes also limit the ability of satellite operators to incorporate the latest technology and to capture emergent terrestrial markets.
OOS offers satellite operators an option for maintaining or improving space-based capabilities without launching a new spacecraft. While OOS by the Space Shuttle has been technically validated (e.g., Solar Maximum repair on STS-41C, 5 Intelsat 603 rescue on STS-49 6 ), the economic case for human servicing architectures is not strong. As originally envisioned, Shuttle would fly 60 times a year at a mission cost of less than $20 million. 7 Shuttle hasn't come close to meeting this goal with estimates of marginal mission costs in excess of $55 million and total mission costs (including supporting ground infrastructure) of $1.3 billion. 8 Furthermore, Challenger stranded commercial programs based on Shuttle 9 and Columbia grounded the fleet for over two years. Given these costs, the human servicing model is clearly not applicable to the majority of commercial space systems. OOS will not occur if the perceived costs outweigh the perceived benefits. However, developments in autonomous and teleoperated vehicle technology as well as the potential for sharing the cost of an OOS infrastructure across multiple target satellites may provide a business case for robotic servicing in certain markets.
The short history of robotic servicing is promising. Beginning with the Japanese ETS-VII autonomous rendezvous and docking demonstration, 10 15 ), more on-orbit validation of critical technologies is needed before robotic servicing technology is considered an operational capability. The commercial viability of robotic OOS is an open question as one of the most lucrative markets identified (i.e., GEO lifetime extension) is poised to shrink due to the shift of GEO communications satellites to electric propulsion. 16 Numerous studies have been performed on robotic OOS, particularly regarding the architecture of the servicing provider. 17, 18 Several customer valuation case studies have also been performed to identify the economic case (or lack thereof) for different categories of servicing missions. 19, 20 Little work, however, has been performed to analyze the physical amenability or "serviceability" of operational satellites currently orbiting the Earth. Is OOS of value to the existing operational satellites around the Earth? If existing satellites were to incorporate docking and refueling interfaces but otherwise maintain the same design paradigm (i.e., high redundancy, long design life, legacy technology), would OOS make sense? These questions are addressed by surveying spacecraft currently in orbit (Section II), developing an agent model of OOS in the GEO belt (Section III), and assessing the ∆V expenditure for servicing particular orbital slots (Section IV). Following a discussion of the implications of the agent model and areas requiring future work (Section V), the paper draws general conclusions regarding the state of robotic OOS (Section VI).
II. Spacecraft Currently in Orbit
The question of whether OOS is of value to current spacecraft is addressed by considering the 773 functioning satellites in orbit around the Earth (as of March 11, 2006) . As a means to rapidly survey the operational population of satellites for OOS targets, the Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS) Satellite Database was utilized. 21 The database is derived from open-source information and is available in Excel as well as a tab-delimited text format.
Updated quarterly, the database includes 21 fields of basic information on each active satellite. Technical information about each satellite's launch mass, dry mass, power, and launch vehicle type are included in the database as well orbital parameters and information on the user, owner, operator, and builder.
Of the 773 satellites included in the UCS database, 534 are communications satellites (318 of which reside in GEO and 203 in LEO). Astronomy and earth observation spacecraft reside primarily in LEO (with GEO early warning satellites being the primary exception for earth observation). Navigation satellites (i.e., U.S. Navstar GPS and Russian Glonass) comprise the preponderance of MEO systems. Table 1 shows the distribution of satellites. Other than navigation satellites in MEO, operational satellite orbits largely consist of LEO for mapping Earth resources, meteorology, and communications and GEO for communications spacecraft. In LEO, resolution and aperture requirements drive orbits to lower altitudes while coverage, lifetime, and survivability drive orbits to higher altitudes. 22 Of the 352 operational LEO satellites, one is in equatorial orbit, 141 are in intermediate orbits (with inclination between 20° and 85°), 86 are in polar orbits (with inclination between 85° and 95°), 122 are in sunsynchronous orbit (with inclination between 95° and 104°), and two are in retrograde orbits (with inclination between 104° and 180°). Over 90% of active satellites are in LEO and GEO. Figure 1 illustrates satellites near GEO altitude with inclinations less than 15°. In order to test the value of OOS, we examine an agent-based model of OOS for this highly-concentrated set of satellites in the GEO belt. 
III. Agent Model Overview
With the context of a multi-year servicing campaign in the GEO belt, an agent model of OOS was constructed consisting of a series of phasing maneuvers between GEO parking slots. 23 An agent model is a computational method for simulating a population of independent agents (satellites) to observe aggregate emergent behavior. Each agent is implemented as an object with internal states and rules of behavior. 24 In the agent model developed here, OOS is treated as a multi-variable optimization problem with the principal trade of minimizing both ∆V expenditures and transfer time. Assuming current launch vehicle, propulsion, and robotic technology for servicing vehicles, the focus in the model is on the serviceability of target satellites. Servicing vehicle operations are simulated over time, completing maneuvers as a function of path-dependent servicing operations. With servicing operations initiated by requests from target satellites that issue "tickets" in a binomial process, a Monte Carlo analysis is performed to derive general results. Primary outputs of the agent model are the cost of servicing (mean ∆V expenditure by servicing vehicle for satisfying tickets) and the performance of target satellites (availability for mission operations).
Upon explaining the scope of the model, the two agents (target satellites and servicing vehicles) are described with a discussion of potential states and the rules governing state transitions. Assumptions regarding servicing vehicle capabilities and initial conditions are also discussed before presenting results.
Activities involving physical manipulation of target satellites are "black box" operations in the agent-model. Additionally, the serviceability framework presented here focuses on servicing multiple satellites at or near GEO. This initial focus on GEO is driven by the two main factors, the high propulsive cost of LEO plane changes using existing technology and the current concentration of high-value satellites in GEO.
For a typical satellite in LEO, a plane change of only three degrees requires on the order of 10% of the mass of the satellite. With cost of propellant approximately $10,000/kg, the lifecycle cost of a LEO servicing system would be high. Relative to LEO, servicing operations in GEO require relatively small amounts of propulsive effort (e.g., 70-120 m/s for the servicing architectures is calculated in Section IV.B.). Despite large physical distances separating GEO satellites, most satellites are in essentially the same orbit. Greater servicing demands are also possible with the concentration of high-value satellites.
A. Agents, States, and Behaviors
Each of the two agents in the OOS model, target satellites and servicing vehicles, has a variety of potential states that are governed by underlying behavioral models.
Target Satellites
Target satellites may be in one of three states: full health with no need of servicing, full health with a request for scheduled servicing, and not operational with a request for urgent servicing. Requests are communicated to servicing vehicles through tickets by target satellites in need of attention. Table 2 illustrates the annual OOS market size in GEO. Based on empirical data compiled on satellite operations between 1957 and 2000, 4 five potential types of servicing missions are identified: refuel, ORU replacement, general repair, relocation in GEO, and deployment assistance. The probabilities in Table 2 inform the frequency of servicing ticket requests in the OOS model with tickets issued in a binomial (discrete Poisson) process. One hour is used as the time step in the model with annual servicing requests mapped to the hourly probability of an individual satellite requesting a given servicing mission. Over the course of a given five-year servicing campaign, 130 servicing tickets can be expected to be generated (on average) by the set of 335 GEO satellites.
If in need of servicing, two types of tickets may be issued by the target satellite: scheduled and urgent. Whether a ticket is scheduled or urgent is assumed to be a function of the predictability of the servicing operation (i.e., unpredictable servicing missions cause urgent servicing tickets to be initiated).
§ Table 2 shows the assumed predictability of each OOS mission. With refueling needs readily projected and ORU replacement as a preplanned activity, the first two OOS missions trigger normal servicing tickets. Repair and deployment assistance missions are assumed to be opportunistic servicing events that are not generally predictable. These trigger urgent servicing tickets. Relocation missions are assumed to be equally divided between predictable (e.g., movement of commercial communications satellites to capture emergent terrestrial markets, retirement) and unpredictable (e.g., surge communication need in conflict, sudden loss of attitude control). It is important to note that the service functions specified in this table do not change the basic capability of the satellite. Rather, the service returns the target satellite to its original capability or allows the capability to be deployed in a new location. § In this discussion, a predictable mission does not imply that it is known years in advance. Rather, it implies that a servicing vehicle may respond in weeks rather than days without strongly affecting the value proposition to the target satellite.
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Servicing Vehicles
Servicing vehicles may be in one of four states: parked in GEO, in transit to a target satellite, servicing a target satellite, or out of fuel. When a ticket is issued, each servicing vehicle calculates the ∆V required to complete the mission ( ) and compares this value to its remaining propellant. Of the servicing vehicles possessing enough fuel, the servicing vehicle that will expend the least amount of ∆V is selected for the servicing mission. Upon "grabbing" a ticket, the servicing vehicle transits to the target satellite with circular coplanar phasing maneuvers.
One of the parameters subjected to sensitivity analysis in the simulation is the transit time for the servicing vehicles to the target satellite. The key trade in the model is between transfer time and ∆V efficiency. Should a servicing provider expend extra fuel to transit more quickly (i.e., reducing the number of phasing orbit revolutions) to a target satellite that has issued an urgent ticket? This issue is addressed by treating response time as a parameter and modeling two servicing architectures: (1) treating all servicing tickets as equals, using a constant number of phasing orbit revolutions and (2) The next issue to resolve is to determine the appropriate number for and . The greater their value, the smaller the ∆V expenditure will be. However, large numbers of phasing revolutions will take more time ( Figure  2a ). In general, this trade between speed and fuel efficiency should be settled by a competitive OOS market (i.e., servicing urgency may drive OOS market segmentation). For the purposes of the agent model of OOS here, it is only necessary to select a baseline value. A heuristic investigation indicates that an even tradeoff between fuel expenditure and time of travel occurs at approximately One constraint on the number of phasing revolutions is the need to select a number of revolutions for the target satellite that does not cause the perigee of the transfer orbit to impose a ∆V penalty due to atmospheric drag or to pass through the Earth. The high velocities and high drag characterizing extremely low altitude orbits imposes a ∆V penalty for orbit maintenance (which could apply if servicers traverse low altitudes when using highly eccentric phasing orbits). So as to make this ∆V penalty trivial, a constraint is imposed on the servicing vehicle (in the case when it trails the target satellite) such that the perigee of the transfer orbit may not be less than 1000 km in altitude.
Upon reaching the target satellite, the servicing operations begin. The ∆V and time costs to the servicing vehicle for operations are assumed to be constants of 50 m/s and one day, respectively. The mission completes with the servicing vehicle assuming a parking orbit in GEO adjacent to the target satellite it just serviced. As such, the orientation of servicing vehicles in the simulation is dependent upon the location of the last set of target satellites. 
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B. Initial Conditions
Initial conditions for the target satellites in the model are based on the orbital elements provided on GEO spacecraft in the UCS satellite database. Four servicing vehicles are assumed to be parked in the GEO belt. Target satellites are initialized based upon the UCS satellite database. Of the 773 spacecraft in the database, 335 are listed as being in GEO and contain true anomaly data. The GEO spacecraft comprise the target satellites used in the model and are assumed to be at GEO altitude with zero degree inclination (a close approximation of reality). Figure 3 illustrates the density of these 335 satellites (in 12° degree slices) over five continents. NORAD identification tags are also tracked in the simulation to establish traceability to satellite attributes beyond orbital elements (e.g., mission area, operator, payload) for later post-processing. Local maxima may be observed over Europe and North America.
Target Satellites
Servicing Vehicles
Although the purpose of the OOS model is not to design a servicing provider architecture, 25 it is necessary to assume a baseline set of servicing vehicles from which the physical amenability of target satellites to rendezvous activities may be derived. For the provider architecture in the model, four servicing vehicles are assumed to be parked in the GEO belt with initial locations of 0, 90, 180, and 270 degrees around the globe.
Current robotic, launch, and propulsion technologies are assumed in the simulation. Each servicing vehicle is based on ESA's Geosynchronous Servicing Vehicle (GSV). 26 With a dry mass of 1200 kg, the GSV consists of a conventionally designed bus, an augmented attitude maneuver and transfer capability, a sensor system for both rendezvous and docking and visual monitoring, and teleoperated robotic arms for mechanical manipulation ( Figure  4 ). Assuming launch with a Delta IV Heavy, the wet mass of the GSV delivered to GEO is 6276 kg. 27 This leaves 5076 kg of fuel for each GSV maneuvering in GEO. Assuming a bipropellant with a specific impulse of 300 seconds for the GSV, the rocket equation yields: 4869 1200 
IV. Results
Figure 5 depicts a sequence of three snapshots taken of the OOS agent model "dashboard" over the course of a typical servicing simulation. The four bars in each row depict remaining ∆V capabilities of the four servicing vehicles. The cumulative number of servicing tickets issued by target satellites is displayed above these "fuel bars." Polar views of the Earth are depicted in the right column. Small dots represent GEO satellites and the four large dots each represent a servicing vehicle. Time is displayed above the polar view. While time steps in the model are tracked in one-hour increments, the time step depicted in the tool dashboard is 30 days. At t=0 (row one), each of the four servicing vehicles possess a full ∆V capability (i.e., 4869 m/s). No tickets have been issued and the servicing vehicles are evenly spaced in GEO parking orbits. At t=30.4 (row two), 2.5 years have passed and 65 tickets have been issued. Each servicing vehicle is parked in the slot of its last servicing operation and has between 3 and 4 km/s of ∆V capability remaining. After five years have passed (row three), 135 servicing requests have been made. Each simulation terminates at the end of the 5 th year (~61 30-day increments). Five years was arbitrarily selected such that the availability calculation of servicing vehicles would not be influenced by servicing vehicles running out of fuel. Simulating servicing vehicle refueling or replacement is outside of the scope of the agent model and left to future work. Performing a sensitivity analysis on servicing provider responsiveness is important for understanding the extent to which assumptions regarding the servicing architecture impact the serviceability results. Since the principal trade in the servicing architecture is between transfer time and ∆V efficiency, the number of allowed phasing orbit revolutions is treated as a parameter as a means to assess its impact on the relative performance of satellites in the serviceability metrics (i.e., availability and ∆V expenditure per servicing mission). Therefore, two five-year OOS campaigns in GEO are investigated. In the first campaign, servicing vehicles use a constant number for phasing orbit revolutions (k=5). In the second campaign, the numbers of phasing orbit revolutions for the servicing vehicle varies as a function of servicing ticket urgency (k=5 for normal tickets, k=1 for urgent tickets). Since servicing tickets are issued probabilistically; and, since ∆V expenditures and response times are functions of both the location of the target satellite of the current servicing mission and the target satellite of the last servicing mission, calculations in the agent model are path dependent. As such, a Monte Carlo analysis, consisting of 1,000 runs of each servicing campaign, is performed to derive meaningful results.
The following two subsections explain the results of the Monte Carlo analyses for the two servicing provider architectures: equal service (i.e., k=5) and priority service (i.e., variable k). The discussion is focused on two key "orbit serviceability" parameters: the availability of target satellites in a particular orbital slot for mission operations (where availability between target satellites is distinguished only by the response time of servicing vehicles) and the average ∆V expenditure for OOS missions to a particular orbital slot (where ∆V expenditure is driven only by the rendezvous activities). Availability is defined as the percentage of the time in the simulation that a given satellite is able to perform its operational mission. Satellites issue urgent servicing tickets (for repair, relocation, or deployment assistance) when they are unable to perform their operational mission. Availability is extremely high for both servicing architectures (i.e., only ~4 hours each year of satellite downtime for "equal service" and 1-3 hours of satellite downtime each year for "priority service"). As observed in Figure 6 , availability is also relatively constant across GEO orbital slots. Although more variation was expected, this result is not altogether surprising given the small probability of urgent servicing tickets being issued and the fact that servicing operations always succeed. While availability is not a good metric for distinguishing between orbital slots, Figure 7 illustrates that ∆V expenditure for servicing missions does vary across the GEO belt as a function of the concentration of other target satellites. Figure 7 plots the median ∆V expenditure for servicing missions in each GEO orbital slot. GEO satellite density is provided to illustrate the inverse correlation between satellite density and ∆V expenditures. In the case of constant response time (labeled equal service), GEO satellites are expected to cost servicing vehicles an average of ~80 m/s for each servicing mission. Unlike availability, ∆V expenditure is not constant around the belt as satellites above North American (-80° to -120°) cost around 70 m/s with a sharp rise to 95 m/s above the Pacific Ocean (-120° to 150°). European (0° to 30°) ∆V expenditures are expected to be around 75 m/s, rising irregularly to around 85 m/s in the Far East (120° to 150°). In the case of a servicing provider architecture with variable response time (labeled priority service), GEO satellites are expected to cost servicing vehicles an average of ~95 m/s for each servicing mission. Again, ∆V expenditure varies between target satellites as a function of orbital slot. North American values constitute the minimum median ∆V expenditure at approximately 85 m/s. GEO slots are most costly above the Pacific Ocean with ∆V expenditures of ~110 m/s. European ∆V expenditures are ~90 m/s, rising irregularly to around 95 m/s in the Far East. An important outcome of this figure is that the correlation of high satellite density and low ∆V expenditure for servicing missions is consistent across servicing provider responsiveness. This allows conclusions to be drawn about the serviceability of target satellites independent of the servicing architecture. Another interesting outcome of this figure is the roughly 20% increase in ∆V expenditure across orbital slots from the first servicing campaign. Given that approximately 30% of servicing tickets are urgent, this suggests that reducing the number of allowed phasing revolutions from five to one on a priority servicing mission increases the required ∆V expenditure by 67%.
A. Servicing Campaign -GEO Satellite Availability
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B. Servicing Campaign -∆V Expenditures
V. Discussion
Many interesting lessons emerged from the agent-based model of OOS with implications for both serviceability assessments of target satellites and servicing provider architecture. Most fundamentally, the high availability of GEO satellites in the model suggests that satellites work too well to stress a simple OOS system. Even in the first simulation with the intermediate response time, servicing vehicle availability exceeded 90%. The vast majority of the time the servicing vehicles are underutilized (e.g., the probability of two or more servicing vehicles conducting servicing missions simultaneously was less than 1%). Underscoring this high availability of servicing vehicles is the fact that all servicing opportunities in the model initiated servicing tickets. Although GEO servicing is potentially the most lucrative with a high concentration of valuable spacecraft and friendly orbital dynamics, satellites launched over the past two decades are designed with too much reliability for frequent utilization of four servicing vehicles. Of course, one servicer could meet the needs of all satellites in our model. However, this would come at the expense of response time and ∆V, and even then, the single servicer would be substantially underutilized.
This simulation indicates that the existing satellites in GEO would not utilize an OOS architecture with sufficient frequency in the current design paradigm. Future work is needed to explore the trade between redundant, highly reliable space systems (current paradigm), and lower cost, less redundant systems that utilize an OOS system to achieve similar reliability. Lowering mission costs has been offered as a motivation for OOS such that operators may choose to rely on servicing as a means to incorporate less redundancy into spacecraft. Other proposals involve reducing upfront costs by designing satellites for shorter lives and delaying the decision either to allocate funds for servicing or to abandon at a later date. Although these justifications make intuitive sense, a rigorous analysis of the costs to incorporate varying levels of redundancy in spacecraft would be a valuable contribution to OOS research.
VI. Conclusions
As a means to bring the benefits of OOS to space systems beyond flagship programs such as the Hubble Space Telescope and International Space Station, the application of robotic technology for the purpose of on orbit satellite servicing is promising. Two main conclusions are drawn based on the existing literature and the simulations described in this paper.
A. Confined to the existing value proposition of communications satellites, the economic feasibility of onorbit servicing is questionable.
The viability of robotic OOS is an open question. In analyzing the physical amenability of satellites to OOS, it was found that the current generation of spacecraft is simply too reliable to ensure a significant market size for potential OOS providers. Grounded in empirical data of annual servicing opportunities, the agent model of OOS applied to geosynchronous orbit found that servicing provider utilization could have increased by an order of magnitude without stressing the utilization factor of four servicing vehicles.
B. The development of a servicing infrastructure in space is dependent on the incorporation of new value propositions into the design and operation of satellites. This paper and other companion studies 19, 20 have shown that the economic viability of OOS is heavily dependent upon the delivery of large performance gains over the long design lifetimes of current satellite architectures. Alternatively, a paradigm shift in geosynchronous communications satellites to shorter design lives 28 is another viable implementation strategy for a responsive space enterprise. Looking ahead, development of an OOS infrastructure will be driven by changes in the existing paradigm of the acquisition and operation of space systems. The responsiveness offered by OOS provides flexibility to capitalize on emergent technology and market opportunities and robustness to mitigate risks-better equipping the satellite industry to deliver value in changing contexts.
